

**CYNGOR SIR POWYS COUNTY COUNCIL.**

**AUDIT COMMITTEE**  
**29<sup>th</sup> July 2022**

**CABINET EXECUTIVE**  
**27<sup>th</sup> September 2022**

**REPORT AUTHOR:** County Councillor David Thomas  
Portfolio Holder for Finance and Corporate  
Transformation

**REPORT TITLE:** Treasury Management Quarter 1 Report

---

**REPORT FOR:** Information

---

## **1 Purpose**

- 1.1 CIPFA's 2009 Treasury Management Bulletin suggested:  
'In order to enshrine best practice, it is suggested that authorities report formally on treasury management activities at least twice a year and preferably quarterly.'

The CIPFA Code of Practice on Treasury Management emphasises a number of key areas including the following:

xi. Treasury management performance and policy setting should be subject to scrutiny prior to implementation.

- 1.2 In line with the above, this report is providing information on the activities for the quarter ending 30<sup>th</sup> June 2022.

## **2 Background**

- 2.1 The Treasury Management Strategy approved by Full Council on 3<sup>rd</sup> March 2022 can be found here - [Council \(moderngov.co.uk\)](https://www.moderngov.co.uk)

## **3 Advice**

### **3.1 Investments**

- 3.2 The Authority's investment priorities within the Strategy are.

- (a) the security of capital, then,
- (b) the liquidity of its investments then
- (c) the yield

- 3.3 The Authority aims to achieve the optimum return on its investments commensurate with proper levels of security and liquidity. The risk appetite has been low in order to give priority to security of investments. With interest rates

for investments remaining significantly lower than borrowing rates, the use of cash reserves as opposed to borrowing is prudent and cost-effective.

- 3.4 Short-term money market investment rates have continued to increase following the two increases to the Bank Rate in the last quarter. This has increased the interest rate on the deposit account with the councils' main bankers from 0.66% to 1.16%. This rate has been very competitive (higher than some 3 month fixed term deposits) while still allowing instant access to the funds. The bank has notified us that they are reducing this to 0.21% in September, so the treasury team are looking at suitable alternatives.
- 3.5 Investment returns on inter-authority lending are expected to remain low due to the relatively high levels of the surplus of cash held by other authorities. When looking at temporary investing, the Treasury team consider the bank fee to set up the arrangement, because of this cost some investments are not cost effective for very short periods of time. However, the Authority does not have sufficient certainty around its cashflow to lend for longer periods where the return is higher.
- 3.6 The Welsh Government repayable funding the council received in March 2021 towards the Global Centre of Rail Excellence (GCRE) is currently being held in the Council's deposit accounts until it is required for the project. This continues to generate interest which, under the terms of the agreement, this interest must be used towards this scheme and is not available for the Council to use.
- 3.7 The Authority had no other investments on 30<sup>th</sup> June 2022.

### **3.8 Credit Rating Changes**

- 3.9 There have been no credit rating changes relevant to this Authority's position during the last quarter.

### **3.10 The Authority's Capital Position**


- 3.11 The 2022/23 Capital Programme was approved by Council on the 3<sup>rd</sup> March 2022. It included capital schemes totalling £133.88 million, of which £25.55 million related to the Housing Revenue Account (HRA). The revised programme at the 30<sup>th</sup> June 2022 is budgeted at £115.31 million following the successful award of additional grants and the reprofiling of budgets between financial years. Actual spend amounts to £11.22 million, representing 10% of the total budget. The £45.00 million that was included in the original programme for the Global Centre of Rail Excellence (GCRE) has at this stage been removed and will be reinstated when it is required.

### 3.12 Table 1 - Breakdown by service

Service	Original Budget	Virements Approved	Revised Budget	Actuals	Remaining Budget	
	£,000	£,000	£,000	£,000	£,000	%
Adult Services	712	139	851	(13)	864	102%
Childrens Services	0	1,111	1,111	283	828	75%
Education	27,868	3,641	31,509	1,256	30,253	96%
Highways Transport & Recycling	14,163	7,268	21,431	4,470	16,961	79%
Property, Planning & Public Protection	100	2,158	2,258	620	1,638	73%
Housing & Community Development	2,462	2,696	5,158	(887)	6,045	117%
Economy & Digital Services	9,974	4,236	14,210	806	13,404	94%
Finance	53,047	(45,525)	7,522	29	7,493	100%
<b>Total Capital</b>	<b>108,326</b>	<b>(24,276)</b>	<b>84,050</b>	<b>6,564</b>	<b>77,486</b>	<b>92%</b>
Housing Revenue Account	25,550	5,708	31,258	4,651	26,607	85%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>133,876</b>	<b>(18,568)</b>	<b>115,308</b>	<b>11,215</b>	<b>104,093</b>	<b>90%</b>

3.13 51% of the capital programme is currently funded through borrowing, the interest cost for this is charged to the revenue account. Finance will be working with the services to reprofile budgets at the earliest opportunity to ensure that only the minimum amount of borrowing is required.

### 3.14 Chart 1 – Capital Programme funding



3.15 Inflation is having a severe impact on the cost of schemes due to rising material and construction costs. It is unclear at this stage how this will impact the programme over the coming years. Services are aware of its impact and are mitigating these increases as far as possible but it is likely that either schemes will be reduced or paused. Any additional funding required is likely to be further

borrowing, this will increase costs on the revenue budget so this will need to be minimised.

- 3.14 The Council's underlying need to borrow for capital expenditure is termed the Capital Financing Requirement (CFR). This figure is a gauge of the Council's indebtedness. It represents the current year's unfinanced capital expenditure and prior years' net or unfinanced capital expenditure which has not yet been paid for by revenue or other resources.
- 3.15 Part of the Council's treasury activities is to address the funding requirements for this borrowing need. Depending on the capital expenditure programme, the finance team organises the Council's cash position to ensure that sufficient cash is available to meet the capital plans and cash flow requirements. This may be sourced through external borrowing or utilising temporary cash resources within the Council.
- 3.16 Net external borrowing (borrowings less investments) should not, except in the short term, exceed the total of CFR in the preceding year plus the estimates of any additional CFR for the current year and next two financial years. This allows some flexibility for limited early borrowing for future years.

### 3.17 Capital Financing Requirement (CFR)


£'m	Total	HRA	Council Fund
<b>Opening Balance – 1<sup>st</sup> April 2022</b>			
Original Estimates <sup>1</sup>	<b>430.33</b>	106.83	323.50
Actual Balance	<b>405.21</b>	101.44	303.77
<b>Closing Balance – 31<sup>st</sup> March 2023</b>			
Original Estimates <sup>1</sup>	<b>468.25</b>	118.62	349.63
Quarter 1 Estimate	<b>441.92</b>	113.44	328.48

<sup>1</sup> Original estimate included in the Treasury Management Strategy approved by Full Council on 3rd March 2022 (excluding GCRE).

### 3.18 Borrowing / Re-scheduling

- 3.19 Effective management of the Authority's debt is essential to ensure that the impact of interest payable is minimised against our revenue accounts whilst maintaining prudent borrowing policies.
- 3.20 A prohibition is still in place to deny access to borrowing from the Public Works Loan Board (PWLB) for any local authority which had purchase of assets for yield in its three year capital programme. There are currently no schemes for yield in the Capital Programme. With the significant amounts of borrowing in the future Capital Programme, the inability to access PWLB borrowing will need to be a major consideration for any future purchases of assets for yield. The additional income these assets generate must be sufficient to cover the increased borrowing costs, as borrowing sources other than the PWLB are likely to be more expensive.

### 3.21 Debt Maturity Profile



**Key** Blue = PWLB; Grey = Inter Authority Borrowing; Orange = Market Loans

3.22 No external borrowing was required during the first quarter of 2022/23.

3.23 £0.54 million PWLB and £10 million of borrowing from other local authorities and has been repaid during the first quarter. A further £1.50 million PWLB and £10 million of borrowing from other local authorities is due to be repaid in the second quarter.

3.24 The staged repayment of the Nant Helen section 106 deposit is continuing as the backfilling works on the site progress. This is also reducing the cash position of the authority; this repayment will reduce the amount the council is under borrowed.

3.25 With the changes to the MRP policy and the delayed requirement to borrow, the revenue budget set aside to cover these costs is projected to be underutilised in this financial year, however as demonstrated in the tables later in the report, these costs are likely to increase year on year.

### 3.26 PWLB Loans Rescheduling

3.27 Debt rescheduling opportunities have been very limited in the current economic climate and following the various increases in the margins added to gilt yields which have impacted PWLB new borrowing rates since October 2010. No debt rescheduling has therefore been undertaken to date in the current financial year.

### 3.28 Financing Costs to Net Revenue Stream

3.29 This indicator identifies the trend in the cost of capital, (borrowing and other long term obligation costs net of investment income), against the Councils net

revenue budget (net revenue stream). The estimates of financing costs include current commitments and the proposals in the capital programme.

£'m	2022/23 Estimate	2023/24 Estimate	2024/25 Estimate
<b>From the approved Treasury Management and Capital Strategy 2022/23</b>			
Financing Costs	11.29	12.17	12.85
Net Revenue Stream	302.33	314.29	324.37
%	3.7%	3.9%	4.0%
<b>Quarter 1 estimates (before any over provision)</b>			
Financing Costs	10.96	12.26	12.77
Net Revenue Stream	302.33	314.29	324.37
%	3.6%	3.9%	3.9%

3.30 The table above shows the capital financing costs and the change between those disclosed in the 2022/23 Treasury Management and Capital Strategy.

3.31 The decrease has been caused by two factors.

1. The reduced borrowing requirement to support the capital programme in 2021/22 and future years. This has been the result of reprofiling of budgets into future years and funding from Welsh Government being made available earlier than anticipated. This has allowed the council to defer the date that it expected to take out additional borrowing, reducing the current interest costs, however this borrowing will still be required in the future.
2. As outlined in the amendment of the 2022/23 Budget approved by Council on the 3rd March 2022, the additional funds provided by Welsh Government, Capital (£3.6m) and Revenue (£2.3m), together with the projected underspend on MRP for 2021/22 (£1.5m) has been used to fund existing Capital schemes.

### 3.32 Prudential Indicators

3.33 All Treasury Management Prudential Indicators were complied with in the quarter ending 30<sup>th</sup> June 2022.

### 3.34 Economic Background and Forecasts

3.35 The forecast of interest rates by the Authority's advisor at the 30<sup>th</sup> June 2022 are shown below. The rates have increased over the last few months but are expected to reduce slightly over the next few years. The current higher rates will increase the cost of borrowing should any borrowing be required before the end of the year.

Link Group Interest Rate View 21.06.22												
	Sep-22	Dec-22	Mar-23	Jun-23	Sep-23	Dec-23	Mar-24	Jun-24	Sep-24	Dec-24	Mar-25	Jun-25
<b>BANK RATE</b>	1.75	2.25	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.50	2.50	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.25
3 month ave earnings	2.00	2.50	2.80	2.80	2.80	2.80	2.60	2.50	2.30	2.30	2.20	2.20
6 month ave earnings	2.50	2.80	3.00	3.00	2.90	2.90	2.80	2.70	2.60	2.50	2.40	2.30
12 month ave earnings	3.10	3.20	3.20	3.20	3.00	2.90	2.80	2.60	2.50	2.40	2.40	2.40
5 yr PWLB	3.20	3.30	3.30	3.30	3.30	3.20	3.10	3.00	3.00	3.00	2.90	2.90
10 yr PWLB	3.40	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.40	3.30	3.20	3.20	3.20	3.10	3.10
25 yr PWLB	3.70	3.70	3.70	3.70	3.70	3.70	3.60	3.50	3.50	3.40	3.40	3.30
50 yr PWLB	3.40	3.40	3.50	3.50	3.40	3.40	3.30	3.20	3.20	3.10	3.10	3.00

3.36 The economic background provided by our treasury advisers; Link Group at the 30<sup>th</sup> June 2022 is attached at Appendix A.

### 3.37 Sundry Debt

3.38 The prompt collection of debt and encouraging payment as soon as possible helps the Councils cashflow position, reducing the need for short term borrowing.

3.39 The following table outlines the Council's sundry debt at the 11<sup>th</sup> July 2022 of £15.13 million. This does not include Council Tax arrears.

Service	Current Debt (30 days or less)	Aged Debt (31 to 60 days)	Aged Debt (61 - 90 days)	Aged Debt (Over 90 days)
Adult Services	3,749,434	306,939	283,746	6,118,670
Children's Services	16,443	5,612	0	222,527
Corporate, Legal & Democratic Services	56,131	0	0	1,581
Digital Services	48,946	565	745	23,998
Finance	117,881	0	1,221	534,550
Highways, Transport & Recycling	191,633	50,170	71,544	704,623
Housing	11,888	107,700	320	237,990
Housing & Community Development	3,829	9,316	30,230	348,638
Leisure	12,264	18,362	313	39,189
Other	38,247	15,414	4,117	64,663
Property, Planning & Public Protection	226,690	75,693	23,248	643,858
Schools	49,374	59,733	0	309,776
Workforce and OD	116,103	82,243	29,966	66,968
<b>Total</b>	<b>4,638,863</b>	<b>731,747</b>	<b>445,450</b>	<b>9,317,029<sup>2</sup></b>

<sup>2</sup> There is a further £1.05 million outstanding debt with the local health board that sits outside this figure.

3.40 The £4.64 million shown in the current debt column relates to invoices that are less than 30 days old and are classed as overdue 30 days after the invoice date.

3.41 The 2022/23 revenue budget includes £73.59 million of generated income. Based on the total debt it represents 21% of the annual generated income, if you exclude the current debt (less than 30 days old) this falls to 14%.

3.42 There is a significant level of aged debt (over 30 days old) and we will monitor this in future reports with the aim to improve this position. This will help the Councils cashflow and reduce the need to borrow.

### **3.43 VAT**

3.44 The Technical Section of Finance act as the authority's VAT section. VAT can pose a risk to the authority hence this report includes VAT information.

3.45 The monthly VAT returns were submitted within the required deadlines during this quarter.

3.46 Key Performance Indicators - The VAT KPI's for 2022/23 are attached at Appendix B.

## **4. Resource Implications**

a. N/A

## **5. Legal implications**

5.1 N/A

## **6. Data Protection**

6.1 N/A

## **7. Comment from local member(s)**

7.1 N/A

## **8. Impact Assessment**

8.1 N/A

## **9. Recommendation**

9.1 This report has been provided for information and there are no decisions required. It is recommended that this report be accepted.

Contact Officer:	James Chappelle
Tel:	01597 826492
Email:	james.chappelle@powys.gov.uk
Head of Service:	Jane Thomas



## Appendix A

### 1. Economics update – Provided by Link

- The second quarter of 2022 saw:
  - GDP fall by 0.1% m/m in March and by 0.3% m/m in April;
  - An easing rather than a collapse in the composite Purchasing Managers Index (PMI);
  - A further rise in Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation to a new 40-year high of 9.1% in May;
  - The first signs that the weakening in economic activity is filtering into a slightly looser labour market;
  - Bank Rate rise to 1.25%, taking it to its highest level since the Global Financial Crisis;
  - Gilt yields caught up in the global surge in bond yields triggered by May's strong rise in US inflation;
  - Rising global bond yields and concerns over growth drive a global sell-off in equity markets.
- Following the 0.1% m/m fall in GDP in March and the 0.3% m/m contraction in April, the economy is now moving towards a recession (two quarters of falling output in a row). Indeed, GDP would need to rise by 0.4-0.5% m/m in both May and June to prevent the economy from contracting in Q2 as a whole. That said, without the joint wind down of the COVID-19 Test and Trace and vaccination programme, GDP would have risen by 0.2% m/m and 0.1% m/m in March and April respectively. That's hardly strong, but it suggests the underlying momentum is not quite as weak as the headline figures imply.
- There is not much evidence that higher inflation and higher interest rates have yet become a big drag on activity. Services output did fall by 0.3% m/m in April. But output in consumer-facing services, conversely, rose by a solid 2.3% m/m in April. And although the Office for National Statistics (ONS) said that some of the 1.0% m/m fall in manufacturing output was linked to the drag on activity from higher prices, it also said that some of the 0.4% m/m drop in construction output in April was a drop back after the boost in the wake of February's Storm Eunice.
- The fact that the composite PMI didn't fall in June also suggests that in Q2 (Apr – June) real GDP has softened rather than collapsed. The S&P Global/CIPS all-sector PMI for June was unchanged from its level of 53.1 in May, signalling tepid but positive growth. According to the Lloyd's barometer, business confidence in May also remained remarkably resilient.
- Despite the fall in the GfK composite measure of consumer confidence to a new record low of -41 in June, April's £1.4bn rise in consumer credit suggests households appear to have turned to credit to support their spending as the cost-of-living squeeze has intensified. Meanwhile, the household saving rate held steady at 6.8% in Q1 in line with its long-term average and we expect households to lower their saving rate further when the bigger falls in real incomes come in Q2 and Q3 to cushion the blow to spending.
- The Chancellor's latest fiscal support of £10.3bn (0.5% of GDP), which comprised £15.3bn of handouts to households, partly funded by a £5bn tax on the profits of oil and gas producers, will help support GDP in the second half of the year. And with the Prime Minister and the Chancellor desperately needing to boost their popularity, some tax cuts may be announced in the Autumn Budget.
- There has been early signs that the recent weakening in economic activity is filtering through into a slightly looser labour market. The unemployment rate edged up from 3.7% in the three months to March to 3.8%. The single-month data showed that employment fell by 254,000 in April and the unemployment rate rose from 3.5% to 4.2%. And the upward march in the number of job vacancies slowed, with the three-month average only rising from 1.296m in April to 1.300m in May. A seasonal adjustment of the single-month data implies that vacancies fell in May for the first time since COVID-19 was rife in December.
- At the same time, a 1.8% m/m fall back in average earnings in April meant that the 3myy rate of earnings eased from 7.0% in March to 6.8% in April. And a lot of the 0.5% m/m rise in earnings

excluding bonuses was probably due to the 6.6% rise in the National Living Wage on 1<sup>st</sup> April. The 3myy rate of earnings excluding bonuses stayed at 4.2%.

- That said, conditions in the labour market remain exceptionally tight. The unemployment rate is still close to its recent 47-year low, and there is the same number of unemployed people as job vacancies and at 6.8% in April, the 3myy rate of average earnings is at a 10-year high (although it is still falling in real terms) and is well above the 3.0-3.5% that is broadly consistent with the 2.0% inflation target (assuming that productivity growth is 1.0-1.5%).
- CPI inflation rose from 9.0% in April to a new 40-year high of 9.1% in May and it is not yet close to its peak. The increase in CPI inflation in May was mainly due to a further leap in food price inflation from 6.7% to a 13-year high of 8.5%. With the influence of increases in agricultural commodity prices yet to fully feed into prices on the supermarket shelves, we think that food price inflation will rise above 10% in September. And with two-thirds of the observation period for the Ofgem price cap having now passed, something like a 40% rise in utility prices is pretty much baked in the cake for October. The further rise in core producer price inflation, from 13.9% to 14.8%, suggests that core goods CPI inflation will probably rise to 14% before long. We think that will take CPI inflation to a peak of around 10.5% in October.
- The rise in services CPI inflation from 4.7% in April to 4.9% in May suggests that domestic price pressures are still strengthening.
- There now seems to be an even greater likelihood that second-round effects, whereby high inflation feeds back into higher price and wage expectations, keep inflation higher for longer. For some time, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) has placed a lot of weight on the results of the Bank of England's monthly Decision Maker Panel which asks businesses how they expect to change their prices and wages over the next year. May's survey revealed that businesses still expect to raise their selling prices by 6.0% and their wages by 4.8% over the next year. Meanwhile, XpertHR said that pay settlements across the economy stayed at a 30-year high of 4.0% in May. The government appears to be contemplating raising public sector pay by up to 5%. And the 7.1% pay rise granted to some railway workers sets a high bar for the negotiations that led to train strikes across large parts of the country in mid-June.
- The MPC has now increased interest rates five times in as many meetings and raised rates to their highest level since the Global Financial Crisis. Even so, coming after the Fed raised rates by 75 basis points (bps) in June and a handful of other central banks have recently raised rates by 50bps, the Bank of England's action is relatively dovish. The MPC's decision not to follow the Fed and raise rates by more makes some sense. The UK's status as a larger importer of commodities, which have jumped in price, means that households in the UK are now facing a much larger squeeze on their real incomes.
- But the MPC's new guidance is that if there are signs of "more persistent inflationary pressures" it will, "if necessary act forcefully in response". We expect the MPC to continue to raise rates in steps of 25bps rather than 50bps. We think the MPC will raise rates from 1.25% now to a peak of 2.75% next year. That's higher than the peak of 2.00% forecast by economists, but lower than the peak priced into the financial markets.
- Gilt yields have been caught up in the global surge in bond yields triggered by the surprisingly strong rise in CPI inflation in the US in May. The rises in two-year gilt yields (to a peak of 2.37% on 21<sup>st</sup> June) and 10-year yields (to a peak of 2.62%) took them to their highest level since 2008 and 2014 respectively. And in response to signs that central banks (particularly the US Fed) are going to raise interest rates faster to get on top of inflation, we now think that 10-year gilt yields will reach a peak of 2.70% (up from 2.39% currently) this year and into 2023.
- While the S&P 500 is 8.4% below its level a month ago, the FTSE 100 is 5.7% below it. Part of the sell-off has been driven by the rapid rise in global bond yields and the resulting downward pressure on equity valuations as well as concerns over economic growth.
- Finally, the pound has already weakened from \$1.37 and €1.21 earlier this year to \$1.21 and €1.16. A lot of these moves have been driven by concerns over the outlook for the global economy and the resulting poor performance of risky assets, which has increased the demand for the dollar relative to sterling. If interest rates rise faster and further in the US than in the UK, rate differentials and a worsening in risk appetite will push the pound even lower, from \$1.21 now to \$1.18 by the end of 2022. We don't expect the pound to fall by as much against the euro (from €1.16 to €1.14

next year). But once global inflation and global interest rates peak, the pound will probably benefit from the return of risk appetite. It may rise to \$1.25 by the end of 2023 and to \$1.30 by the end of 2024.

### **MPC meetings 5<sup>th</sup> May and 16<sup>th</sup> June 2022**

- After the Bank of England became the first major western central bank to put interest rates up in this upswing in December, it has quickly followed up its first 0.15% rise by a further four 0.25% rises to 1.25%, in what is very likely to be a series of increases repeated throughout the rest of 2022 and into 2023.
- In May, the MPC voted 6-3 vote in favour of a 0.25% increase, but not only was this the first time in its 25-year history that the MPC had raised rates at four meetings in a row but also three members (Haskel, Mann and Saunders) wanted a 0.5% hike (up from none in March). However, GDP growth was forecast to drop to -0.25% in 2023 (+1.25% previously) and only +0.25% in 2024 (+1.00% previously). Anyone for a recession?
- Nonetheless, over Q2, it is clear central banks in the developed economies have placed the dampening down of inflation pressures front and centre of their primary objectives, even if it comes at the cost of sluggish growth or, indeed, recession (mild ideally but it is very difficult to micro-manage economic performance). The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) is in step with this approach although, arguably, the UK economy is dragging its feet to a greater extent than that seen in the US.
- What are the key factors for consideration? First, the CPI measure of inflation is already at 9.1%, and the Bank of England anticipates it will peak near to 11% just before Christmas. With the cost-of-living squeeze in full swing by that juncture, and unemployment likely to be ticking upwards, we judge that the Bank will pause following its March 2023 meeting and judge it has done enough so long as inflation starts to fall, albeit at a slow pace. To that extent, we can envisage the MPC waiting a full year before loosening the reins and starting to cut Bank Rate in spring 2024. However, given the number of geopolitical factors that could push this forecast off track, we would caution against taking a strong view on how interest rate movements evolve and instead focus on optimising balance sheet management and the risk management of investment and debt portfolios.
- Regarding gilt yields, all developed economies have seen a considerable uplift in government bond yields across the whole curve since the start of 2022 and, in many ways, gilts have simply played catch-up of late. To that end, we have revised our PWLB forecasts upward and you will even see we have a 3.7% PWLB rate projected for the 25-year part of the curve in both 2022 and 2023. However, as headline inflation falls back, we project a slow reduction in gilt yields as investors acknowledge that price pressures are gradually coming under control.
- At the 16<sup>th</sup> June MPC meeting, part of the reason for the Committee only seeing a 0.25% hike as necessary is the prevailing weak economic data. The vote was again 6-3 (the same as in May) but the words were more hawkish with the Bank strengthening its forward guidance. It deleted the previous phrase that “some degree of further tightening...may still be appropriate” and replaced it with “the scale, pace and timing of any further increases in Bank Rate will reflect the Committee’s assessment of the economic outlook and inflationary pressures” and that “the Committee will be particularly alert to indications of more persistent inflationary pressures, and will, if necessary, act forcefully in response.”
- Whereas in May two members objected to the guidance that rates will rise further, it appears that all members are behind this new, stronger guidance. However, the growing evidence that firms’ price and wage expectations have become dislodged from the 2.0% target suggest that the Bank is between a rock and a hard place in navigating the appropriate monetary policy response. As always, the economic data will be key to anticipating whether our assumptions remain sound.

## **2. Interest rate forecasts**

The Council has appointed Link Group as its treasury advisors and part of their service is to assist the Council to formulate a view on interest rates. The PWLB rate forecasts below are based on the Certainty Rate (the standard rate minus 20 bps) which has been accessible to most authorities since 1<sup>st</sup> November 2012.

The latest forecast on 21<sup>st</sup> June is compared below to the previous forecast (10<sup>th</sup> May). A comparison of these forecasts shows that PWLB rates have increased generally and show a speed up in the rate of increase in Bank Rate as inflation is now posing a greater risk. The increase in PWLB rates reflects a broad sell-off in sovereign bonds internationally as inflation concerns abound. To that end, the MPC has tightened short-term interest rates with a view to trying to slow the economy sufficiently to keep the secondary effects of inflation – as measured by wage rises – under control, but without pushing the economy into recession.

Our current and previous PWLB rate forecasts below are based on the Certainty Rate (the standard rate minus 20 bps) which has been accessible to most authorities since 1<sup>st</sup> November 2012.

Link Group Interest Rate View 21.06.22												
	Sep-22	Dec-22	Mar-23	Jun-23	Sep-23	Dec-23	Mar-24	Jun-24	Sep-24	Dec-24	Mar-25	Jun-25
<b>BANK RATE</b>	1.75	2.25	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.50	2.50	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.25
3 month ave earnings	2.00	2.50	2.80	2.80	2.80	2.80	2.60	2.50	2.30	2.30	2.20	2.20
6 month ave earnings	2.50	2.80	3.00	3.00	2.90	2.90	2.80	2.70	2.60	2.50	2.40	2.30
12 month ave earnings	3.10	3.20	3.20	3.20	3.00	2.90	2.80	2.60	2.50	2.40	2.40	2.40
5 yr PWLB	3.20	3.30	3.30	3.30	3.30	3.20	3.10	3.00	3.00	3.00	2.90	2.90
10 yr PWLB	3.40	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.40	3.30	3.20	3.20	3.20	3.10	3.10
25 yr PWLB	3.70	3.70	3.70	3.70	3.70	3.70	3.60	3.50	3.50	3.40	3.40	3.30
50 yr PWLB	3.40	3.40	3.50	3.50	3.40	3.40	3.30	3.20	3.20	3.10	3.10	3.00

Link Group Interest Rate View 10.5.22													
	Jun-22	Sep-22	Dec-22	Mar-23	Jun-23	Sep-23	Dec-23	Mar-24	Jun-24	Sep-24	Dec-24	Mar-25	Jun-25
<b>BANK RATE</b>	1.25	1.50	1.75	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75
3 month ave earnings	1.20	1.50	1.70	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70
6 month ave earnings	1.60	1.90	2.10	2.20	2.20	2.20	2.20	2.10	2.00	1.90	1.90	1.90	1.90
12 month ave earnings	2.00	2.20	2.30	2.40	2.40	2.30	2.30	2.20	2.20	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.10
5 yr PWLB	2.50	2.50	2.60	2.60	2.60	2.60	2.60	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50
10 yr PWLB	2.80	2.80	2.90	2.90	2.90	2.90	2.90	2.80	2.80	2.80	2.80	2.80	2.80
25 yr PWLB	3.00	3.10	3.10	3.20	3.20	3.20	3.10	3.10	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00
50 yr PWLB	2.70	2.80	2.80	2.90	2.90	2.90	2.80	2.80	2.70	2.70	2.70	2.70	2.70

- LIBOR and LIBID rates ceased at the end of 2021. In a continuation of our previous forecasts, our money market yield forecasts are based on expected average earnings by local authorities for 3 to 12 months.
- Our forecasts for average earnings are averages i.e., rates offered by individual banks may differ significantly from these averages, reflecting their different needs for borrowing short-term cash at any one point in time.

## **A SUMMARY OVERVIEW OF THE FUTURE PATH OF BANK RATE**

- Our central forecast for interest rates was last updated on 21<sup>st</sup> June and reflected a view that the MPC will be keen to further demonstrate its anti-inflation credentials by delivering a 0.25% increase in Bank Rate in August, September, November, December, February and March i.e., the next six MPC meetings.
- The CPI measure of inflation is now forecast to rise to close to 11% in Q4 2022 and the MPC will be keen to stifle the prospect of average earnings data (6.8% y/y currently including bonuses) providing further upside risk to inflationary factors that are primarily being driven by supply-side shortages.
- When Bank Rate reached 1% in May, the MPC indicated (no earlier than August) that it will also consider the extent to which it implements Quantitative Tightening (QT), primarily the selling of gilt holdings. However, they are likely to take any such decision cautiously as they are already not refinancing maturing debt.
- Notwithstanding the MPC's clear desire to increase Bank Rate throughout 2022, negative real earnings, the 54% hike in the Ofgem energy price cap from April (to be followed by a potential 40%+ further increase from October), at the same time as employees (and employers) have incurred a 1.25% Health & Social Care Levy, growing commodity and food inflation plus council tax rises - all these factors will hit households' finances hard. However, lower income families will be hit disproportionately hard despite some limited assistance from the Chancellor to postpone the full impact of rising energy costs.
- Given the above outlook, it poses a question as to whether the MPC may shift into protecting economic growth if it flatlines or contracts through 2022. Accordingly, we remain tentative about whether the MPC will increase Bank Rate as far as the market is currently pricing in (3.25% in April 2023).
- In the upcoming months, our forecasts will be guided not only by economic data releases and clarifications from the MPC over its monetary policies, but the on-going conflict between Russia and Ukraine, including the manner in which the West and NATO respond through sanctions and/or military intervention. Currently, oil, gas, wheat and other mainstream commodities have risen significantly in price and central banks will have to balance whether they prioritise economic growth or try to counter supply-side shock induced inflation.
- On the positive side, consumers are estimated to be sitting on over £160bn of excess savings left over from the pandemic so that will cushion some of the impact of the above increases. However, most of those are held by more affluent people whereas lower income families already spend nearly all their income before these increases hit and have few financial reserves.

## **PWLB RATES**

- The yield curve has steepened considerably through the quarter and PWLB 5 to 50 years Certainty Rates are, generally, in the range of 2.75% to 3.75%.
- We view the markets as having built in, already, nearly all the effects on gilt yields of the likely increases in Bank Rate and the poor inflation outlook (although we thought that in May and markets went much further than expected in respect of the gilt market sell-off).
- It is difficult to say currently what effect the Bank of England starting to sell gilts will have on gilt yields now that Bank Rate has gone to above 1%. Nothing will be decided before August, however, but the Bank is likely to act cautiously as it has already started on not refinancing maturing debt. A pure roll-off of the peak £875bn gilt portfolio by not refinancing bonds as they mature, would see holdings fall to about £415bn by 2031, which would be about equal to the Bank's pre-pandemic holding.
- Increases in US treasury yields over the next few months could add further upside pressure on gilt yields as they have done since the turn of the year.

**The balance of risks to the UK economy: -**

- The overall balance of risks to economic growth in the UK is to the downside.

**Downside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates include: -**

- **Labour and supply shortages** prove more enduring and disruptive and depress economic activity (accepting that in the near-term this is also an upside risk to inflation and, thus, rising gilt yields).
- **The Bank of England** acts too quickly, or too far, over the next three years to raise Bank Rate and causes UK economic growth, and increases in inflation, to be weaker than we currently anticipate.
- **UK / EU trade arrangements** – if there was a major impact on trade flows and financial services due to complications or lack of co-operation in sorting out significant remaining issues.
- **Geopolitical risks**, for example in Ukraine/Russia, Iran, China, North Korea and Middle Eastern countries, which could lead to increasing safe-haven flows.

**Upside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates: -**

- The **Bank of England is too slow** in its pace and strength of increases in Bank Rate and, therefore, allows inflationary pressures to build up too strongly within the UK economy, which then necessitates an even more rapid series of increases in Bank Rate faster than we currently expect.
- **The Government** acts too quickly to cut taxes and/or increases expenditure in the light of the cost-of-living squeeze.
- **The pound weakens on the back of UK/EU trade friction** resulting in investors pricing in a risk premium for holding UK sovereign debt.
- Longer term **US treasury yields** continue to rise strongly and pull gilt yields up higher than forecast.

## **Appendix B**

### **VAT - Key Performance Indicators**

#### **Creditor Invoices**

VAT return for	No of high value Creditor invoices checked	No of Creditor invoices highlighted as requiring "proper" document for VAT recovery	% of creditor invoices checked requiring "proper" document for VAT recovery
Apr-22	269	3	1.12%
May-22	294	8	2.72%
Jun-22	247	4	1.62%
Jul-22			
Aug-22			
Sep-22			
Oct-22			
Nov-22			
Dec-22			
Jan-23			
Feb-23			
Mar-23			

#### **Income Management Entries**

VAT return for	No of entries checked by formula per the ledger account code used	No of entries needing follow up check (but not necessarily incorrect).	% of entries needing follow up check
Apr-22	857	0	0.00%
May-22	955	2	0.21%
Jun-22	1,080	0	0.00%
Jul-22			
Aug-22			
Sep-22			
Oct-22			
Nov-22			
Dec-22			
Jan-23			
Feb-23			
Mar-23			

## Debtor Invoices

VAT return for	No of Debtor invoices checked	No of checked debtor invoices with incorrect VAT code used	% of debtor invoices with incorrect VAT code
Apr-22	81	0	0.00%
May-22	73	0	0.00%
Jun-22	84	0	0.00%
Jul-22			
Aug-22			
Sep-22			
Oct-22			
Nov-22			
Dec-22			
Jan-23			
Feb-23			
Mar-23			

Note: Debtors VAT checking is carried out by Finance via a work process prior to the invoice being raised hence the improvement in errors compared to previous years

## Purchase Cards

VAT return for	No of transactions for which paperwork requested for checking	Resolvable errors discovered	Value of VAT potentially claimable but recharged to budget due to non- response	No of transactions where VAT claimed incorrectly	% of transactions available to be checked where VAT was claimed incorrectly	Value of VAT incorrectly claimed hence recharged to budget
Apr-22	155	22	£2,668.91	14	9.03%	£380.22
May-22	142	14	£2,159.74	25	17.61%	£196.73
Jun-22	141	15	£2,048.25	18	12.77%	£1,005.40
Jul-22						
Aug-22						
Sep-22						
Oct-22						
Nov-22						
Dec-22						
Jan-23						
Feb-23						
Mar-23						



### Chargebacks to service areas

The upload of appropriate documents to the Barclaycard purchase card system to enable vat recovery was made mandatory in September 2017 as a result of the lack of response from service areas/establishments to provide documents when requested. Where no document has been uploaded, any VAT amount input against the transaction is charged to the service area as there is no evidence to support the vat recovery.

Any other VAT errors that come to light as a result of the various checks are also charged to the relevant service areas.

Budget holders are able to see this clearly as chargebacks are coded to account code EX400600 and the activity code used alongside this gives the reason why this chargeback has occurred.

The total amount charged back to service areas in 2022/23 is £12,386 to date. The breakdown of this is as follows:

### Potentially correctable errors

<b>Reason</b>	<b>Amount £</b>
Not a tax invoice	5,527
Powys County Council is not the named customer	0
No invoice uploaded to purchase card system	4,290
Invoice(s) do not match payment	755
No evidence to back recovery	0
No Signed Authenticated Receipt	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>10,572</b>

### Other errors

<b>Reason</b>	<b>Amount £</b>
Non-domestic VAT	463
No tax on invoice	264
Supply not to Powys County Council	50
Over-accounting for VAT	991
Internal payments	46
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,814</b>